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In the public goods literature, there have been recently a number of 
experiments which demonstrate how the problem of the under-provision of a 
public good can be solved through mutual monitoring and sanctioning 
between the members of a group when antisocial behavior is observed. In 
many circumstances, however, we can not allow for punishment and 
exclude the possibility of counter-punishment occurring. We design a public 
goods experiment based on Fehr and Gaechter (2000) where we allow for 
both punishment and counter-punishment. We find that in both Partner and 
Stranger treatments average contributions decline steadily over time, at a 
rate similar to the treatment were no punishment was allowed, and tend 
towards full free-riding. The reason for this change seems to be that under 
the threat of counter-punishment people are less willing to punish. An 
important result is that participants squander their endowment in punishment 
and counter-punishment actions leading to a relative payoff loss, in 
comparison to the treatment without punishments. 
 
                                                 
* The title is a reference to Ostrom, Walker and Gardner (1992): “Covenants with and without a 
sword: Self governance is possible”.  I would like to express my gratitude to Hans Normann for 
his invaluable help at every stage of this paper. I would also like to thank Marco Casari for the 
helpful comments. Please send further comments to n.nikiforakis@rhul.ac.uk  
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1. Introduction 
Contrary to the predictions of standard economic theory that people will not 
contribute voluntarily for the production of a public good, a considerable 
amount of experiments have shown that, initially, people give on average 
between 40 and 60 percent of their endowment. The contribution level, 
however, decreases with repetition under the influence of free-riders [Davis 
and Holt (1993), Ledyard (1995), Fehr and Fischbacher (2003)].  
Recent experiments have also shown that people are willing to 
punish behaviour, which is deemed to be antisocial. Under the punishment 
threat free-riding is curtailed [Fehr and Gaechter (2000), Bowles, Carpenter 
and Gintis (2001), Page and Putterman (2000), Sefton, Shupp and Walker 
(2002), Masclet, Noussair, Tucker, Villeval (2003), Carpenter (2002)]
1. 
In the seminal paper by Fehr and Gaechter (2000) (hereafter F&G), 
participants played a two-stage public good game. In the first stage, they 
were asked to divide their endowment between a public and a private 
account. The returns from each account were designed so that group 
earnings were maximized when participants contributed all their money in 
the public account. However, each individual had an incentive to keep his 
endowment for himself. The results confirmed previous findings with 
significant contributions (40-60 percent) in the beginning of the experiment, 
which declined over time.  
In the second stage, participants were allowed to assign punishment 
points to the other members in their group after they were notified about 
individual contributions in the public account
2. Punishment was costly for 
both the punisher and its receiver. The introduction of punishment 
                                                 
1 For a brief description of these papers, which deal with punishment in a public goods 
environment see section A.3 in the appendix. The observed rejection of positive offers in 
experimental ultimatum games is another indication of people’s willingness to punish 
unfair behaviour (Gueth and Tietz [1990], Camerer and Thaler [1995], Roth [1995], Fehr, 
Gaechter, and Kirchsteiger [1997], Forsythe, Horowitz, Savin and Sefton [1994], Davis and 
Holt [1993]. See also Zizzo and Oswald (2001). 
2 The announcements were made in such a way that the formation of individual reputation 
across periods was not possible.  
  2opportunities led to significantly higher contributions and to an eventual 
payoff gain relative to a treatment where participants were not allowed to 
punish. We will return to this paper and its results later on. 
This experimental design of F&G has become the standard by which 
to study the influence of punishment on cooperation in a public goods 
environment. However, in every day life, one can often observe many cases 
of free-riding and the unwillingness of the cooperators to punish. At the 
same time, there exists an abundance of anecdotal evidence that people are 
willing to engage in costly counter-punishment. An example of the 
unwillingness to punish can be found in the case of the refusal by some 
countries to sign the Kyoto Protocol for the reduction of the emissions of 
greenhouse gasses in the atmosphere
3. Many countries, which agreed to the 
conditions of the Protocol, expressed their dissatisfaction with the “free 
riders” without, however, taking any measures to discipline them.  
We conjecture that the reason for the avoidance of punishment, in 
cases where free-riding is observed, is the fear of counter-punishment. More 
over, often, we can not allow for punishment and exclude the possibility of 
counter-punishment occurring. Since counter-punishment is inseparable 
from punishment, we shall refer to the type of punishment in models as the 
one by F&G as “one-sided punishment”, in contrast to the “two-sided 
punishment” where counter-punishment is allowed. 
  To test the hypothesis that the threat of counter-punishment can be 
the explanation for the observed free-riding, we designed a public goods 
experiment with two treatments: one without any form of punishment, the 
familiar voluntary contribution mechanism (VCM), and one with 
punishment and counter-punishment (P&CP). To have a solid basis for 
comparison of our results, we based the experimental design to the one by 
Fehr and Gaechter (2000) (F&G). The two treatments were run both under 
the partner and the stranger protocol.  
                                                 
3 Air is a textbook case of a pure public good. 
  3In the VCM treatment, as we will see, average contribution exhibited 
a similar behaviour to the one reported so far in other experiments, by 
starting between 40 and 60 percent of the endowment and decreasing over 
time. The introduction of counter-punishment opportunities in the P&CP 
treatment seems to cancel out, to a large extent, punishment’s so far 
observed disciplinary effect and participants behave similarly to the VCM 
treatment with average contribution declining with repetition. In the words 
of Girard (1979): “Reciprocal violence now demolishes everything that 
unanimous violence has erected”. We show that an explanation for this is 
that under the counter-threat, people are less willing to punish and as a 
result, people are almost free to free ride.  
To our knowledge, there is no other paper testing for the effect that 
the existence of counter-punishment opportunities has on the level of 
cooperation. Although in our experiment no explicit coordination 
opportunities exist, in the partner treatment, the fact that the composition of 
the groups remains the same might lead to the formation of behavioural 
norms that will alleviate free-riding more effectively
4. 
The remaining of the paper is structured as follows: section 2 
introduces the experimental design and the procedures of the experiment, 
while section 3 presents the predictions of standard economic theory for this 
set up. Section 4 discusses the experimental results and section 5 concludes. 
 
  2. The Experiment  
2.1 The experimental design:  
To have a clear picture of the effect that counter-punishment has we based 
our design on F&G (2000). The experiment consists of two treatments using 
a related sample design: one without any punishment (VCM), and one with 
two-sided punishment i.e. with punishment and counter-punishment 
(P&CP). We run the treatments both under the partner protocol, where the 
                                                 
4 Masclet et al. (2003) show that when the same group of people play a finitely repeated 
public goods game the expression of disapproval towards anti-social behavior can also play 
a significant role in decreasing free-riding.  
  4composition of each group remains unchanged throughout the experiment 
and under the stranger protocol, where the participants where randomly re-
matched in each period. For each treatment there were 12 subjects who were 
randomly divided in groups of 4 people and played a finitely repeated public 
goods game for 10 periods.  
All participants were aware that each treatment would last exactly 10 
periods. However, they were not aware that a second treatment was to 
follow
5. The related sample design has the advantage that additionally to 
across-subjects comparison we can make within-subjects comparisons of the 
average level of contribution, which have much more statistical power. To 
test for sequence effects, in session 1 (stranger) and session 3 (partner) the 
participants played the P&CP treatment first and the VCM second, whereas 
in sessions 2 (stranger) and 4 (partner) the order was reversed.  All this can 
be summarised in table 1: 
 
Table 1: Treatment Conditions 
P&CP / VCM VCM / P&CP
Stranger
Session 1:         
3 groups of 4 
participants
Session 2:         
3 groups of 4 
participants
Partner
Session 3:         
3 groups of 4 
participants
Session 4:         




2.1.1 The VCM treatment: 
The first treatment is the standard voluntary contribution mechanism as 
presented first by Isaac, Walker and Thomas (1984). In the beginning of 
each of the ten periods, every participant received a fixed amount of 20 
Experimental Currency Units (ECUs)
6. The participant had then to decide 
                                                 
5 Following the example of F&G, to keep the results from the first treatment unaffected by 
the existence of a second treatment.   
6 The ECU was exchanged at a rate of 1 ECU = 4 p.  
  5how many ECUs to keep for himself and how many to invest into a project. 
All the participants made their decision simultaneously and without being 
aware of the others’ decisions. The monetary payoff for each subject in each 
period was given by:  
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where 20 is the endowment in ECUs,   is the amount of ECUs subject i 
invests in the project (0≤ ≤20) and 0.4 is the marginal return per capita 
(MRPC) from the project. This payoff function implies that each player’s 
income comes from two sources: the money he keeps for himself, as 
indicated by  and a fraction of the total amount that the group 
invested in the project,0 . The total payoff from the no-punishment 



















Equation (1) also implies that full free-riding ( =0) is a dominant 
strategy in the stage game. This follows from ∂ /∂ =-1+0.4<0, which 
means that the more an individual contributes to the project the less her 
income will be in that stage. However, the aggregate payoff, ∑ is 
maximized if each group member fully cooperates ( =y), since 
∂ /∂ =-1+4*0.4>0. This inequality shows that the more people 
contribute, the higher the aggregate payoff; therefore, the total payoff of the 
group will be at its highest point when the participants contribute their 
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In the first treatment, the payoff function (1), the amount of the 
endowment (20 ECUs), the MPRC (0.4), the number of the subjects and the 
duration of the treatment were all common knowledge between the players. 
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2.1.2 The P&CP treatment: 
In the second treatment, two more stages were added to the simple voluntary 
contribution mechanism, which now became the first of three stages. In the 
second stage subjects were given the opportunity to simultaneously punish 
each other after being informed of the individual contributions
7. To do so, 
group member i had to assign punishment points to group member j. This 
had two different effects in the payoffs of members i and j: for each point 
received by player j his income from the first stage, , was reduced by 
10%. Note that the first stage income could never be reduced below zero, so 
if player j received more than 10 punishment points his income was reduced 
by 100%. Additionally, player i also faced a cost for distributing punishment 
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≠
Table 2: Punishment points per player and associated costs for the punishing subject 
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Given the above information, the payoff at the end of the second stage for 
subject i is equal to:   
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7 For the whole experiment we used neutral framing. Punishment was referred to as 
“assigning points” in order to “reduce” another participant’s income. The public good itself 
was named “project”.  
  7Again, the payoff function (2), the cost function ( ), the amount of the 
endowment (20 ECUs), the MPRC (0.4), the number of the subjects and the 
duration of the treatment were all common knowledge.  
) (
j
i j i p c
≠
Up to the end of the second stage, the experiment is identical to the 
one by F&G. In the third and final stage, the subjects were informed how 
many points each of the other members in their groups assigned to them. 
They then were given a last opportunity to reduce the income of the 
participants who punished them during the second stage
8. For the calculation 
of the end-of-period income the same function for the payoff and the 
punishing points were used as before. The only difference is that now the 
second stage income was used as a basis instead of the first stage income, 
i.e.: 
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where   is the number of counter-points that player i assigns to player j 
and the cost of counter-points is equal to the cost of punishment points i.e. 
=) . Note that the cost for assigning points works 
accumulatively i.e. if player i punished player j in his group with 2 points 
during the second stage and then with 2 further (counter-) points in the third 
stage, his total cost from points would be equal to 6 i.e. the cost of 4 points. 
j
i cp





 To prevent the possibility of forming an individual reputation, every 
player received a number between 1 and 4, in the beginning of each period, 
which he retained for the duration of the period, but which changed in the 
next one.    
  
                                                 
8 Note that only the subjects who were punished were allowed to punish back. This was 
done to avoid strategic punishing. By strategic, we mean that a subject, if allowed, could 
have punished lightly or not at all in the second stage to avoid counter-punishment and then 
more heavily in the third. Obviously, such a design would not be appropriate to measure the 
effect of counter-punishment. 
  82.2. Procedures 
The experiment took part between December 2003 and January 2004 in the 
experimental laboratory of Royal Holloway, University of London. It 
consisted of five sessions (2 partner, 2 stranger and 1 control), which lasted 
approximately an hour and forty-five minutes
9. The participants were 
recruited via e-mail by using the Royal Holloway Economics Experiments 
Team mailing list. The total number of the subjects was 60. Twenty-four of 
them took part in the partner treatment (VCM and P&CP), twenty-four in 
the stranger (VCM and P&CP) and 12 more in the control session (stranger 
VCM and One-Sided Punishment). The sample consisted of students with 
different nationalities and backgrounds including Economics
10. Being in the 
above-mentioned mailing list implied that the participants might have taken 
part in economics experiments before, although not in a public goods 
experiment. 
The subjects were gathered outside the laboratory and then entered 
the lab in a random order one by one. They sat in such a way that it would 
have been impossible for them to see who the other participants in their 
group were, in order to avoid the communication effect.  
At the beginning of each of the treatments, the participants were 
given a different set of instructions explaining in detail what was to 
happen
11. They were then given as much time as they needed to read the 
instructions and to fill in a brief control questionnaire. Once the participants 
were ready, a supervisor approached and privately checked the answers and 
answered any questions that the participants had.
12 Afterwards, and due to 
the complexity of the experiment, the supervisor read out a pre-written 
summary of the key points and asked for any possible questions. Finally, a 
trial period was used were the participants were introduced to the computer 
                                                 
9 The control treatment lasted slightly less.  
10 Contrary to other findings (Marwell and Ames [1981]) the economists-to-be were arguably 
the strongest supporters of cooperation. 
11 The instructions can be found in section A.1 of the appendix.  
12 In general, the only explanations that the supervisors had to give were regarding incorrect 
answers in the control questionnaire. These cases however were very few. 
  9screens they would have to use to make their decisions. Again, a pre-written 
text was used for this, to ascertain that all subjects would receive the same 
explanations regardless of the session they participated. The experiment was 
programmed and conducted with the software z-Tree (Fischbacher [1999]). 
Participants earned on average £18.05. No show up fee was given.  
 
3. Predictions 
The subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium prediction is in all treatments that 
participants should contribute nothing to the project, i.e. =0, for every i. In 
specific, in the treatment without punishment the dominant strategy is to 
free ride. Using backward induction for the ten periods we find that the 
dominant strategy is to contribute nothing in the project.  
i g
In the P&CP treatment the subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium 
prediction is that people will never counter-punish in the third stage, since 
this is costly and yields no material benefits. The same applies for 
punishment in the second stage. Finally, at the first stage, the participants 
understand that no one is going to punish them no matter whether they 
cooperate or not, and therefore they have no reason to contribute to the 
project, thus choosing to contribute zero. Applying backward induction for 





        
4. Experimental Results 
 
We will begin by analyzing the effect of counter-punishment first under the 
stranger and then under the partner protocol.  
 
4.1 The impact of counter-punishment under the stranger protocol 
If the introduction of counter-punishment is of no importance then we 
should observe no difference in the behaviour of the participants in 
comparison to other experiments who studied one-sided punishment. This 
  10means that in the P&CP treatment people should increase significantly their 
level of contribution to the public good in comparison to the VCM treatment 
and continue to do so under the threat of punishment. However, there is a 
significant difference between this behaviour and the one observed when 
counter-punishment was possible. 
 
Result 1: The existence of punishment and counter-punishment causes a 
minor aggregate increase in the average contribution level, which is, 
however, considerably smaller of the one when only punishment was 
present.  
 
Table 3: Mean contributions in the stranger-
treatment 
   mean contribution in all 
periods  
mean contribution in the 
final periods 
Session  VCM P&CP VCM  P&CP 
1 3.97  6.80  2.17  3.83 
 (1.66)  (1.71)  (2.69)  (3.13) 
2 3.55  2.47  0.58  0.92 
   (3.23)  (1.86)  (1.44)  (1.51) 
mean  3.76 4.63 1.38  2.38 
   (2.35)  (1.71)  (2.26)  (2.83) 
 VCM  Punishment  VCM Punishment 
FG mean  3.7  11.5






FG session 3  4.5  10.7  2.0  13.1 
 (6.0)  (4.9)  (3.8)  (4.0) 
NSN control  6.9  10.4  2.83  9.25 
 (2.29)  (1.14)  (4.20)  (5.83) 
Note: The numbers in parentheses indicate standard deviations. In session one 
the treatment with P&CP was played first and then the VCM whereas in session 
2 the roles were reversed. NSN refers to the authors initials. 
 
 
Support for the first result comes from Table 3. On the first part of table 3, 
comparison of columns 2 and 3 shows that in session 1 we had an increase 
on the average contribution level, whereas in session 2 (when the VCM was 
played first) counter-punishment led to a decrease
13. For completeness we 
add the aggregate results from F&G
14.  
                                                 
13 It has been shown that the outcome of a public goods game is largely dependent on the 
mixture of selfish and altruistic individuals, and the environment in which the game is 
played (Fehr and Fischbacher [2003]). In session 2, 4 participants could be characterized as 
  11The first thing that one should notice is the striking similarity of the 
results in the VCM treatment between the two experiments.  On average, the 
contribution level increases from 3.76 to 4.63 that is by 23%, which is 
significantly different from the 211% increase that the introduction of 
punishment opportunities caused in F&G. This result supports our 
hypothesis that the effect of counter-punishment should eliminate to a large 
extent the positive effect of punishment on cooperation.  
To test for differences in behaviour across countries based on 
cultural characteristics (Burlando and Hey [1997]) we also run a session 
identical to session 3 of F&G. In the last rows of table 3 we see that the 
introduction of one-sided punishment in our sample increases average 
contribution. Again, the average contribution in the one-sided punishment 
treatment across all periods is very similar between the two experiments, as 
the participants were able to sustain cooperation. However, whereas in F&G 
average contribution was higher in the final period, in our case, there was an 
end-of-treatment effect
15. The results indicate that the difference in behavior 
can indeed be attributed to the introduction of counter-punishment 
opportunities and not in cultural differences. Our next result deals with the 
evolution of average contribution over time. 
 
Result 2: In both the VCM and the P&CP treatments, average contributions 
converge to free-riding over time. 
 
A first indication for result 2 can be found in table 3 by examining columns 
and 5: we can see that there is a small difference between the final periods 
of the two treatments. Looking at columns 3 and 5, we observe the decline 
in average contributions. By comparison of the means, we witness that there 
                                                                                                                                           
“perfect free riders” as they contributed zero in all periods. These subjects were able to drag 
down cooperation very quickly.  
14 Fehr and Gaechter had 3 independent observations each one with 24 subjects. Dufwenberg 
and Sneezy (2000) have shown that there is no difference in the results when using 12 or 24 
subjects. 
15 The evolution of average contribution can be seen in figure13 in the appendix. 
  12is a small increase in average contribution in our experiment, which 
however is significantly smaller than in F&G and our control. In contrast to 
these, one can see the increase in cooperation that punishment alone caused 
when looking columns 3 and 5 on the lower part of table 2. 
Result 2 is better understood by looking at figure 1 and 2. Though 
the two treatments were played in sequence, we place the results over the 





















































Figure 1: Average contribution over time in the stranger-treatment 
(session
(session 1) 



































P&CP VCMFrom both figures it is apparent that counter-punishment has a dramatical 
effect on cooperation. Whereas in experiments with one-sided punishment 
average contribution was increasing over time, in our experiment the course 
of averag
session 1, people achieve a higher level of contribution than in VCM, but it 
e contribution is reversed and cooperation is deteriorating. In 
appears to be falling towards the end. In session 2, where the VCM was 
played first, punishment is no longer able to increase cooperation and it 
remains most of the time at an even lower level than in the treatment with no 
punishment reaching ultimately reaching complete free-riding
. If we 
aggregate the results of the two sessions we get figure 3. 
 
Figure 3: Average contribution over time in the stranger-




























Figure 3 shows how strong the effect of counter-punishment is in the 
stranger-treatment. The evolution of the average contribution over time in 
the two treatments is almost identical, which suggests that in the stranger-
treatment counter-punishment balances off the effect of punishment 










The first result in the partner-treatment deals with the average contribution 
over all periods.  
 
esults 1 and 2 deal only with average contributions. To
take a look at the behavio deeper understanding we  ural regularities at
individual level. Result 3 summarizes the findings. 
 
Result 3: There is very similar behaviour in the final period of both 
treatments and free riding emerges as the modal action. 
 
The aforementioned result comes from figure 4. Although the percentage of 
people who free-ride completely in the P&CP treatment is significa
lower than in the VCM, one can still notice the similarity of the results and
the total absence of  participants who contributed more than 10 ECUs. 
 
Figure 4: Distribution of contributions in the final period 












































18 19 20 Contributions
VCM P&CP
 
4.2 The impact of counter-punishment in the partner-treatment 
  15Result 4 ishment 
pportunities causes a ris on level.  
vidence for result 4 can be found in table 4. By comparing column 2 with 
olumn 3 we notice that contribution has increased on average in all the 
roups. According to a Wilcoxon matched pairs test, with group averages as 
bservations, this difference is statistically significant (p=0.028, two-tailed). 
n average, subjects contribute from 1.7 (group 6) to 4.9 (group 3) times 
ore than in the no-punishment condition. In the P&CP condition, 
articipants contribute on average 42 percent of their endowment. The 
crease in contribution (136%), in comparison to the VCM treatment, is 
milar in amount to the one found by F&G, although the aggregate levels in 
oth conditions seem to be half in our case.   
  If we compare column 2 with column 4 and column 3 with column 
 we find again that in both treatments and for all 6 groups there has been a 
f the P&CP, 
Mean contributions in the partner-treatment 
  mean contribution in all 
periods 
mean contribution in the 
final periods 
: The introduction of punishment and counter-pun














decline on the average level of contribution. In the final period o
participants contribute on average only 2.71 ECUs. This is result 5: 
Table 4: 
Group  VCM P&CP VCM P&CP 
1 4.45  13.03 0  10 
 (2.55)  (1.44) (0) (3.56) 
2  0.73 2.33 0.25  0 
3  1.58 7.73 0.25  0.5 
4 3.7  7.15 0 3.25 
5 2.95  7  0  5 
6 7.85 13  0  0.25 
      
 (1.51)  (3.09)  (0.5) (0) 
 (3.20)  (6.30)  (0.5)  (0.58) 
 (3.90)  (2.84) (0) (3.95) 
 (3.24)  (1.07) (0) (5.77) 
 (5.52)  (5.68) (0) (0.5) 
Mean  3.54 8.37 0.07 2.71 
 (4.1)  (5.32)  (0.28)  (4.61) 
 VCM Punishment VCM Punishment
FG mean  7.5  17






Note: The numbers in parentheses indicate standard deviations. In session 
three (groups 1, 2, 3) the treatment with P&CP was played first and then the 
VCM whereas in session 4 (groups 4, 5, 6) the roles were reversed.  
  16 
 
Result 5: Both in the VCM and the P&CP conditions of the Partner-
free riding. 
 
treatment average contributions decrease over time and converge to full 
Additionally to the evidence given in table 4, result 5 can be better 
summarized i figur re  the P&CP 
condition was played first, and session 4, where the order was reversed, 
respectively, and show the evolution of the average contribution over time.  
 
Figure 5: Average con on ov e in the rtner-
treatm session
n  es 5 and 6, which rep sent session 3, where
tributi er tim  pa













































  17Figure 6: Average contribution over time in the partner-




































    
Figures 5 and 6 show again that coun ent draws away some of 
the power that punishment had to discipline free riders. In both sessions, the 
average contribution to the public good in the P&CP treatment initially is 
roughly 12 ECUs and then follows a similar negative trend and settles at 
approxima cteristics 
as in most reported experim itionally cooperative and 
begin by contributing a significant fraction of their endowment which varies 
between 40 percent (session 1) to 60 percent (session 2). However, soon the 
free-riders drug the cooperation in both cases down until it reaches almost 
complete free riding. 
In the P&CP treatment there is on average a higher level of 
contribution, which might reflect the hopes of the subjects that they will be 
able to control the free riders and also their own fear of being punished. Still 
in both cases, the subjects, as they become more experienced, start 
contributing less and average contribution converges towards free-riding. 
ter-punishm
tely 3.5 ECUs. The VCM treatment has the same chara
ents. People are cond
  18If we put the results of the two sessions together we get figure 7. 
Average contribution declines at a similar rate in both treatments. The 
contribution level difference which was not present in the stranger-treatment 
might be attributed to the willingness to avoid disapproval (Masclet et 
al.[2003])or at the repeated interaction between the participants (Fehr and 
Fischbacher [2003]) .  
 
Figure 7: Average contribution over time in the partner-




































    Our last result concerning the partner-treatment has again to do 




Result 6: In both treatments, free-riding emerges as the modal action. 
 
Evidence for result 6 is drawn from the histogram in figure 8, which shows 
the relative frequency of contributions in the final period. As we can see, f
eatments zero contribution is the mode. In the P&CP condition, 54 
percent of the participants choose to free-ride completely and 13 percent 
  19more to contribute just one ECU
16. There are some individuals with higher 
contributions. In the VCM treatment, 92 percent decide to free-ride 
completely and the remaining 8 percent contribute one ECU. 
 
 
Figure 8: Distribution of contributions in the final 
periods of the partner-treatment. 




























4.3 Willingness to punish 
So far we have shown that the introduction of counter-punishment 
ge 
imilar to ours, 
owever, as the experiments proceed the results diverge. In F&G, as well as 
ution 
creases with repetition. In our experiment, average contribution decreases 
from its existence, but every individual would rather avoid its cost. The 
                                                
opportunities has a drastic effect to the level and the evolution of avera
contribution. The initial contributions in F&G are very s
h
in other experiments using one-sided punishment, average contrib
in
in both sessions, at a rate similar to that of the treatment without 
punishment, and it tends towards full free riding. The question that arises 
therefore is what triggers this different behaviour?  
Punishment is a second order public good since everyone benefits 
 
16 This is a vast departure from the 82.5 percent of participants who chose to cooperate 
completely in F&G when counter-punishment was absent. 
  20possibility of counter-punishment and the uncertainty of its harshness make 
punishment more costly and people less willing to punish. If this is the case 
indeed, we should observe a decline in the number of sanctions, which 
would then explain the existence of free riding. 
 To h volution of 
the average number o periment and the one 
of F&G. Our findings are summarized by result 7. 
 
Result 7: When we allow for counter-punishment, the average number of 
sanctions decreases significantly in both the partner and the stranger-
treatment, even though average contribution declines. 
 
Evidence for Result 7 is drawn from figures 9 and 10, which depict the 
evolution of the average number of sanctions over time. As we can see in 
figure 9, in the stranger-treatment of F&G there is a decline in the average 
number of sanctions over time reflecting mainly the increase on the level of 
contribution. The average number settles at approximately 0.65
17. This 
implies that the participants, having realized the effectiveness of 
e last non-cooperators to contribute more until the 
last moment.  
attributed to the realization that the threat of punishment can not alleviate 
 
                    
ave a basis for comparison we will juxtapose the e
f sanctions over time from this ex
punishment, try to push th
    In our experiment, the average number of sanctions starts at a 
much lower level and pursues a similar course, which could now be 
free-riding and also that punishment can be punished. In the final period, 




                             
17 An average of “0.25” implies that on average there was one sanction per group. An 
average of “1” implies that on average there were 4 sanctions per group i.e. one per player. 
18 The existence of participants who are willing to punish in the last period is an indication 
of the willingness of people to punish even when they do not anticipate any material 
benefits. 
  21Figure 9: Evolution of the average number of punishments 









































In the partner-treatment, after the second period, the average number 
of sanctions in F&G falls sharply following the increase in the subjects’ 
cooperation levels and continues to do so with minor increases until it is 
 riders in order to stop declining contribution. 
owever, after period 5 there is a major decline on the average number of 
unishments possibly reflecting the “surrender” of the cooperators and the 
verage settles at very low levels (less than one punishment action per 
group). The difference of the average number of sanctions across treatments 
finally stabilized around 0.6.  
In our experiment, the average number of sanctions in the partner-
treatment is also downward sloping, but moves at much lower levels. 
Between periods 3 and 5 there appears to be an effort from the cooperators 




  22is statistic hitney 
U test with the averag observations
19. 
 
Figure 10: Evolution of the average number of punishments 
sanctions in the partner-treatment 
ally significant under both protocols according to a Mann-W






































Result 7 becomes even more remarkable if we take to consideration  
the fac
                                                
t that in our experiment, where average contribution was at a much 
lower level, participants had a more serious reason to want to punish. On the 
other hand, in the experiment by F&G, average contribution was constantly 
increasing approaching full cooperation eliminating the reasons for 
punishment. These findings lend support to the hypothesis that counter-




19 These results are supported by our findings in the control treatment. The difference 
between the average willingness to punish in the control treatment (NSN) and session 3 of 
F&G is not significant as it becomes apparent from figure 14 to be found in the appendix. 
  234.4 Effectiveness of punishment 
The effect that counter-punishment has on the willingness to punish is not 
the only one: counter-punishment appears to diminish the effectiveness of 
punishm
In F&G, 89  creased their 
contribution in the partner and in the stranger-treatment respectively, after 
they were punished. The average increase was 4.6 ECUs under the partner 
and 3.8 ECUs under the stranger protocol. In this experiment only 30 
percent (partners) and 27 percent (strangers) increased their contribution 
level by an average of 3.6 ECUs and 4 ECUs respectively, following a 
punishment. So why are people less responsive to punishment? 
   First, we have to see whether the actual size of the punishments is 
now different i.e. do people punish more lightly in order to avoid 
retribution? In the partner-treatment of F&G, the weighted average size of 
punishment was 1.71, whereas in this experiment it was equal to 2.20
20. So, 
if anything, participants punished even more on average when counter-
punishment was present. The answer, therefore, to the previous question can 
not be found here.  
The situation is reversed in the stranger-treatment, where the 
weighted average size of punishment in F&G was 1.90, in contrast to the 
1.47 of our experiment .  In this case, therefore, part of the observed lack of 
reaction to punishment might be attributed to the lower average size of 
punishment. 
This fact is somewhat surprising since even people who did not 
counter-punish were unwilling to raise their contribution. An explanation to 
this might be that participants, sensing the modest willingness of 
cooperators to punish free riders, were aware of the constant decline in 
                                                
ent.  
and 78 percent of the participants in
21
 
 Under the partner protocol, the average size of punishment in session 1 and session 2 of 
F&G was 1.73 and 1.68 respectively. In this experiment the average size of punishment was 
1.86 and 2.79 for session 1 and session 2 respectively. 
21 Under the stranger protocol, the average size of punishment in session 1, session 2 and 
20
session 3 of F&G was 1.96, 1.90 and 1.85 respectively. In this experiment the average size 
of punishment was 1.36 and 1.57 for session 1 and session 2 respectively. 
 
  24cooperation. As a result, participants who got punished chose not to raise 
Result 
tion, where 
cooperate and though it comes with a cost (i.e. money given to buy 
punishment points and the income loss that punishment implies) it 
As pointed out earlier, in the real world, punishment is not restricted 
to one-sided and is often followed by an act of counter-punishment. 
Counte
weapon on the hands of the free riders.  One key question, therefore, to be 
answered is: how does the punishment option together with counter-
 Or, more simply, was Mahatma Gandhi right when he 
predicted: “An eye for an eye will make us all blind”? 
average group payoff of between two treatments normalized by the average 
their contribution in subsequent rounds pre-empting the decay of 
cooperation.  
 
8: In the presence of counter-punishment, people react less to 
punishment.  
 
4.5 Payoff Consequences of Two-Sided Punishment 
We saw earlier that the Nash equilibrium in the voluntary contribution 
mechanism with zero contribution (i.e.  i g =0) and an individual payoff of 20 
ECUs, is not the Pareto-dominant, welfare-maximizing solu
i g =20 and the individual payoff equals to 32 ECUs. It has been shown 
[Fehr and Gaechter (2000)] that punishment alone can force people to 
eventually leads to an improvement for the society as whole.  
r-punishment on the other hand implies additional costs and is a 
punishment affect the average group payoff? Is the group better off now 
than before?
    To answer this question we calculate the relative payoff gain of the 
punishment and counter-punishment, which is equal to the difference of the 
group payoff of the no punishment treatment. In mathematical terms: 
 
VCM payoff group aver
VCM payoff group aver CP P payoff group aver
gain relative
. . .




  25 
Figure 11 depicts the payoff consequences that counter-punishment and 
punishment have over time in both the stranger and partner treatment. As we 
can see, the squander of the endowments in sanctions and counter-sanctions 




Under the stranger protocol there is an almost constant convergence 
which almost reach zero at the last periods (see figure 9) and of the almost 
identical contributions between the VCM and the P&CP treatment (figure 
). In the partner-treatment, however, where punishment is more effective in 
raising contributions and there are implicit opportunities for coordination, 
relative payoff follows a more turbulent path. In the last two periods, n both 
leads to a relative payoff loss; in 8 out of 10 periods in the stranger 
treatment and 
Figure 11: Payoff consequences of puni


















































towards 0, which is the result of the declining number of punishments, 
3
 i
  26conditions the relative difference approaches zero, which implies that the 
rder, participants might be better 
off free riding and avoiding costly punishment. In combination to the 
previous res d, 
Under the stranger protocol, 20% of the 94 sanctions were answered 
back. Out of them 73.7% answered back giving as many counter-points as 
the pu
average payoff in the different treatments is approximately identical. This is 
the result of similar contributions and the declining number of sanctions.  
This finding indicates how harmful mutual monitoring can be to a 
society. It also demonstrates that in the presence of counter-punishment, 
where the controlling of the free riders is ha
ults it serves as a sign that counter-punishment might lea
eventually, to similar outcomes to the treatment where no punishment was 
possible i.e. similar contributions, no punishments and similar payoffs.  
 
Result 9: Under both protocols, punishment with counter-punishment leads 
to a relative payoff loss for most of the experiment until the participants 
learn to behave as in the VCM treatment i.e. not contribute and not punish. 
 
4.6 What drives punishment? 
The standard economic theory predicts that participants will neither punish 
nor counter-punish given that this is costly and their actions are expected to 
yield no material benefits. Our findings contradict this prediction.  
Under the partner protocol there were 91 sanctions 30% of which 
were answered back. Of the latter, 40.7% punished with more points than 
the ones received. The average size of counter-punishment was 2.29 points 
opposed to the average size of punishment which was 2.20.  
nishment points they received. Only 15.8% were answered back 
giving more points than those received. This might be an indication that 
under the partner protocol people tried to establish a reputation for the group 
that punishment will not be tolerated. The average size of counter-
punishment was 1.60 points, when the average size of punishment was 1.47. 
  27The high propensity towards punishment makes it important to 
identify the forces behind the participants’ punishing activities. To do this 
we run a Tobit regression on the following model as in Masclet et al. (2003): 
 
)] [m 4 3 2 1 0
t
i i i j j i
j
i p + = α α , 0 [max( )] , 0 [max( )] , 0 [max( )] , 0 ax(
t t t t t t t c c c c c c c c − + − + − + − α α α
 
where 
j p  is the punishment points that player i assigns to player j, 





player i' ntribution in period t and c is the average contribution of in 
period t of i's group.  To model time effects we also include period dummies 
along with a group dummy for the partner-treatment and a session dummy 
for the stranger-treatment. We wish to see whether the introduction of 
counter-punishment has altered the significance of the independent 
variables. The results from the regression can be found in table 4. 
 
Table 4: Determinants of punishment 
Dependent Variable: punishment points given    
Independent Variables  Strangers  Partners 
0.227*** 0.252***  Negative Deviation from punisher's 
contribution ( 1   (0.050) (0.084) 
-0.088 0.091  Positive  Deviation from punisher's 
contribution ( 2 α )  (0.091) (0.085) 
α )
3
0.150* 0.090   Deviation from Group's 
 contribution (α ) 
0.049 -0.231  Positive  Deviation from Group's 
Average contribution  ( 4
(0.082) (0.120) 
α )  (0.136) (0.167) 
Constant ( 0





Observations  720 720 
otes: Numbers in parentheses indicate standard errors 
  ** Significant at the 5-percent level 
 
As we can see in both treatments the main driving force of punishment 
seems to be the negative deviation from the contribution of the punisher. 
The less the punished contributes in comparison to the punisher the higher 
Uncensored Observations  94 91 
N
    *** Significant at the 1-percent level 
    
        * Significant at the 10-perecent level 
  28the pun
e group’s average is significant at the 10-percent level, but the same does 
not apply for the partner-treatment. This is a surprising result since we 
would expect the group standard to ore important under the partner 
coefficient of 
ishment will be. This result is in agreement with the findings of 
Masclet et al. (2003) and Falk et al. (2000) and might be taken as an 
indication of spitefulness. In the stranger-treatment, negative deviation from 
th
 be m
protocol as in F&G (2000). Also surprising are the positive sign for the 
2 4
treatment .  
   Due to the limited number of counter-punishments, it is impossible 
to derive a meaningful explanation for its determinants through regression 
analysis. It appears that a small fraction of the participants dislike 
punishment so much that they counter-punish at every opportun
α α
22  Masclet et al. (2003) run the same regressions, though only for the partner-treatment and 
in the partner-treatment and of  in the stranger-
22
ity given, 
hereas others seem to take in consideration the initial cause of their 
ent i.e. their contribution in relation to the others in their group and 
punish only when they feel they did not deserve punishment.  
uals 
 noticed   3 a difference  tributing 
et en the different grou  observation m  deeper 
al tions essential.  
t to the exp nts with one-sided punishment 
there seems to be a big variation in in ities that are alleviated 
towards the end. Under both protocols itial contributio  from 0 
he subjects appear to decrease their contribution over 
stant at either high or low levels of 
ear to be undecided about whether to contribute a 




4.7 Selfish vs. Altruistic individ
The careful reader might have
behaviour b we
in table in con
ps. This akes a
look at the individu  ac
In general, in contras erime
dividual activ
, the in ns vary
to 20 ECUs. Most of t
time, some keep it relatively con
contribution and some app
 
found all of the aforementioned variables to be significant at the 1-percent level. 
  29lot or little. Some individuals contribute zero throughout the P&CP 
treatment
23. These are summarized in tables 5 and 6
24.  
Table 6 is particularly useful since we can observe how the actions 
of a participant affect the future decisions of the other group members. It 
appears that it takes only one determined free-rider to bring cooperation 
down. This cannot be better illustrated than in the case of group 6 
(participants 21-24), where 3 participants were strong supporters of 
cooperation contributing for most of the experiment 20 CUs. Subject 22, 
who contribu
 E
ted not more than 13 ECUs at any instance, forced the other 
 me
e other group 
embers
26. However, his 77 points(!) were not enough to increase 
onsequence was that by the end of the 
se initial contributions did not vary 
greatly
                                                
three mbers to drop substantially their contributions from period 7 
onwards. Note that none of the cooperators used punishment extensively. 
The ability of the free riders to obliterate cooperation under this set up can 
also be seen in the cases of group 3 (subjects 9-12), group 4 (subjects 13-16) 
and in lesser extent group 2 (subjects 5-8).  
Another notable case is group 5: subject 20, a strong reciprocator
25, 
spent most of his money in the experiment to sanction th
m
cooperation within the group. The c
experiment he had also decreased his contribution.  
An enlightening exception to this is group 1 (subjects 1-4). All four 
members were like-minded people who
. As a result, though they could not increase cooperation, they were 
able to sustain it at the initial levels. All these are summarized in result 10.  
 
Result 10: The level of cooperation when counter-punishment is allowed 
depends on whether or not selfish individuals exist: one determined selfish 
 
23 It is interesting to observe that most of these participants also spend no money on punishment 
activities. 
24 See appendix. 
25 A “strong reciprocator” is an individual willing to engage in costly activities, even when this 
 all sessions. 
yields no future material benefits for him (Fehr and Fischbacher [2003]). 
26 As a result, subject 20 won, by far, the least money  amongst the participants in
  30individual can obliterate cooperation like in the VCM treatment. 
Cooperation seems possible only between like minded individuals. 
m for the discipline of selfish 
individ
order to alleviate free 
riding. 
 
p to the point where participants realise that they can not control the free-
independent body is needed to enforce it. 
    The situation might even be understated. We believe that one of 
t




In the last years there has been a considerable amount of papers indicating 
the significance of mutual monitoring and decentralised sanctions in the 
provision of public goods. These papers show that contrary to standard 
economic theory people are willing to punish and under this threat 
contribution levels rise significantly. However, often, we can not allow for 
punishment excluding counter-punishment. Our hypothesis is that 
punishment elicits negative emotions amongst the punished, which in turn 
might lead to counter-sanctions.  
   Our results show that when we introduce counter-punishment, 
punishment stops being a valid mechanis
uals and the efficient provision of public goods. Under both the 
stranger and the partner protocol, contributions decrease over time and in 
some cases approach full defection.  
The reason behind this behaviour is the decreased willingness of 
cooperators to turn into punishment activities in 
In this environment, one determined free rider appears to be enough 
to bring down cooperation.  
Mutual monitoring amongst individuals is now a harmful devise 
since it leads to a large squander of resources without any beneficiary result
u
riders and give up cooperating. In our opinion, this serves as a warning that 
in many cases people are unable to achieve cooperation and a formal 
he characteristics of the individuals who chose to free ride in the real world 
is often their 
might be even less willing or not willing at all to punish free riders in fear of
  31a severe counter-punishment. An additional reason which affects the 
willingness to punish negatively might be the group size; punishment is a 
second order public good, counter-punishment, however, is not. As a result, 





counter-punishment will be. 
    Our results are related to that of Carpenter (2002) who shows that 
when the price of punishment increases the demand for it decreases. This 
diminishes the threat of punishment and leads to a raise in free-riding. In an 
indirect way, the threat of counter-punishment increases the price an 
individual has to pay in order to punish. However, in our view, punishment 
comes always at an (expected) high cost since counter-punishment amongst 
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  34Appendix:  
 Instructions  A.1
The
we tried to adopt the instructions of F&G (2000). The instructions to the 
e 
foll earn 
 considerable amount of money. It is therefore important that you take your 
The instructions which we have distributed to you are for your private 
info ticipants 
dur .  
Dur
urrency Units (ECU). Your entire earnings will be calculated in ECUs. At 
 
onverted to Pounds at the rate of 1 ECU = 4 p and will be immediately 
t the beginning of the experiment the participants will be randomly divided 
into
articipants.  The composition of each group will remain the same 
thr  
period is divided into 3 stages. 
 
The first stage:
se are the instructions we used in session 3. For maximum comparability 
other sessions are available from the author upon request. 
 
You are now taking part in an economic experiment. If you read th
owing instructions carefully, you can, depending on your decisions, 
a
time to understand the instructions.  
 
rmation.  Please do not communicate with the other par
ing the experiment. Should you have any questions please ask us
  
ing the experiment we shall not speak of Pounds, but of Experimental 
C
the end of the experiment the total amount of ECUs you have earned will be
c
paid to you in cash.  
 
A
 groups of four. You will therefore be in a group with 3 other 
p
oughout the experiment. The experiment lasts 10 periods and each
 
At the beginning of each of the 10 periods each participant will receive 20 
ECUs. In the following, we shall refer to this amount as the “endowment”. 
  35In the first stage, your task is to decide how to use your endowment. You 
have to decide how many of the 20 ECUs you want to contribute to a 
project (from 0 to 20) and how many of them to keep for yourself. The 
 project you will 
be informed about, the group’s total contribution, your income from the 
Income from the 1st stage = Endowment of ECUs  - Your contribution to the Project
consequences of your decision are explained in detail below.   
 
Once all the players have decided their contribution to the
project and your payoff in this period. Your payoff in each period is 
calculated using the following simple formula. Again, if you have any 
difficulties do not hesitate to ask us.  
 
                  + 0.4*Total contribution to the Project 
 
This formula shows that your first stage income consists of two parts:  
1)   The ECUs which you have kept for yourself (endowment – contribution) 
2)  The income from the project, which equals to the 40% of the group’s 
the sum of the contributions of all group members are 
60 ECUs. In this case, each member of the group receives an income from 
 of keeping the ECUs for yourself or 
ontributing them to the project. Each ECU that you keep raises your end of 
y 1 ECU. Supposing you contributed this point to the 
total contribution. 
  
The income of each group member from the project is calculated in the same 
way. This means that each group member receives the same income from 
the project. Suppose 
the project of: 0.4*60=24 ECUs. If the total contribution to the project is 9 
points, then each member of the group receives an income of: 0.4*9=3.6 
ECUs from the project. 
  
You always have the option
c
period income b
project instead, then the total contribution to the project would rise by 1 
ECUs. Your income from the project would thus rise by 0.4*1=0.4 ECUs. 
  36However, the income of the other group members would also rise by 0.4 
ECUs each, so that the total income of the group from the project would be 
1.6 points. Your contribution to the project therefore also raises the income 
of the other group members. On the other hand you also earn an income for 
each point contributed by the other members to the project. In particular, for 
entual losses during the experiment. 
However, you can always evade losses with certainty
each point contributed by any member you earn 0.4 ECUs. 
 
In addition to the 20 ECUs per period, each participant receives a one-off 
lump sum payment of 25 ECUs at the beginning of this part. This one-off 
payment can be used to pay for ev
 through your own 
ome m the eriod e from all 
th
decisions. Note that this lump sum payment will not be used to calculate the 
inc ro  p . It will only be added to your total incom  f
e periods at the very end. 
 
The second stage: 
 
At the second stage you will be informed how much each group member 
 if you give a member 1 point you reduce his or her 
income 0 percent. If you give a member 2 points you reduce his or her 
contributed individually to the project at the first stage. At this stage you can 
reduce or leave equal the income of each member of your group by 
distributing points. The other group members can also reduce your income 
if they wish to.   
 
If you choose 0 points for a particular group member, you do not change his 
or her income. However
 by 1
income by 20 percent, etc. The amount of points you distribute to each 
member determines, therefore, how much you reduce their income from the 
first stage. If one player receives in total 4 points his income will be reduced 
by 40% and if he receives 10 or more his income from the first stage will be 
reduced by 100%.  
  37 
If you distribute points you have costs in ECUs, which depend on the 
amount of points you distribute. You can distribute between 0 and 10 points 
to each group member. The more points you give to any group member, the 
higher your costs. Your total costs are equal to the sum of the costs of 
distributing points to each of the other three group members. The 
following table illustrates the relation between distributed points to each 
P
group member and the cost of doing so in ECUs.  
oints  0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10 
ost of points 
er person  0 1 2 4 6 9  12  16  20  25  30 
 
Example: Supposing you give 2 points to player 1 this costs you 2 ECUs; if 
you also give 8 points to player 3 this costs you a further 20 ECUs; and if 
you give 0 points to the las
C
p
t group member this has no additional cost for 
you. In this case, your total costs of distributing points would be 22 ECUs 
(2+20+0) and not 30 ECUs.  
 
Your total income from the two stages is therefore calculated as follows: 
Total income (in ECUs) at the end of the 2
nd stage = 
= (Income from the 1st stage)*[1-(1/10)*received points] - costs of      
distributed points ,  where received points can’t be more than 10 points 
 
Please note that your income in ECUs at the end of the second and the third 
st
stage can be negative, if the costs of your points distributed exceeds your 
(possibly reduced) income from the 1  stage. You can however evade such 
losses with certainty through your own decisions.  Should your income 
become zero or negative at the end of the second stage you will not be able 
to continue to the third stage. If your income becomes zero or negative at the 
end of the third stage you can simply use your 25 ECUs that we gave you in 
the beginning in order to pay this off. 
 
  38The third stage: 
 
 of assigning oin  as ell   th nc  reduction caused by 
each point remain the same as before. : if you distribute 2 points in the 
Total income (in ECUs) at the end of the period = 
 
In the third and final stage, after being informed of the points that the other 
group members assigned to you, you will be given one last opportunity of 
assigning points back to the other participants, thus reducing their income. 
We shall call this points “counter-points”. You will only be able to assign 
counter-points to participants who assigned points to you during the 
second stage 
The costs  p ts,  w as e i ome
  Note
second stage to player 1 you have a cost of 2 ECUs If in the third round you 
decide to distribute 3 more to player 1 then the total cost is 9 ECUs. 
 
Your profit at the end of the period is equal to: 
 
 
= (Income costs of   from the 2nd stage)*[1-(1/10)*received counterpoints] - 




If you have any further questions please raise your hand and one of the 




1. Each group member has an endowment of 20 ECUs. Nobody (including 
you) contributes any ECUs to the project. What is: 
a.  Your income at the end of the first stage?  ……… 
.The income of the other group members?………  b
  39 
2.Each group member has an endowment of 20 ECUs. You contribute 20 
ember has an endowment of 20 ECUs. The other three group 
members contribute together a total of 30 ECUs to the project. What is: 
20 ECUs. You contribute 8 
ECUs to the project. What is: 
a.  Your in er group 
members together contribute a further total of 7 ECUs to the 
project
p 
members together contribute a r total of 22 ECUs to the 
project  
 the following points to your three other 
group members: 9, 5, 0. What are the total costs of your distributed 
oints?…. 
7.By h tage be reduced 
when y
ECUs to the project. All other group members contribute 20 ECUs each to 
the project. What is: 
a.  Your income at the end of the first stage?  ……… 
b.The income of the other group members?……… 
 
3.Each group m
a.  Your income at the end of the first stage if you contribute 0 ECUs 
to the project? ………. 
b.Your income at the end of the first stage if you contribute 15 ECUs 
to the project? ………. 
 
4. Each group member has an endowment of 
come at the end of the first stage if the oth
?............... 




5.At the second stage you distribute
p
 
6.What are your costs if you distribute 0 points? ……  
 
ow many percent will your income from the first s
ou receive from the other group members a total of: 
  40a.  0 points? … 
8.At th your three other 
group m  following points 









b.4 points? ... 
c.  15 points? …  
 
e second stage you distribute the following points to 
embers: 2, 2, 0. In the third stage you distribute the
distributed points?…. 










































































































olution of the average number of punishments  










A.3 Brief summary of related articles 
In the introduction, we mentioned a number of papers were one-
sided punishment was used. Here we take a more detailed look in some of 
them.  
Sefton et al. (2002) have a similar treatment to F&G with similar 
results; moreover they include a treatment with rewards, where participants 
can transfer a fraction of their endowment to someone else in their group, 
and a treatment with both sanctions and rewards. They find, amongst others, 
that subjects use both rewards and sanctions, but in a different way: initially 
rewards are at a higher level than sanctions, though they appear to decline 
faster and are not as capable for sustaining cooperation as sanctions. 
Sanctions, however, come at a higher social cost than rewards due to the 
income loss they entail. Their results show that the treatment that allows for 
both sanctions and rewards is the most effective for the production of a 
ublic good. 
Masclet et al. (2003) study the influence of informal sanctions on the 
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attributed to the existence of informal sanctions. To do this, in addition to 
the punishment treatment of F&G, they used a treatment where no 
sanctioning was possible and another where individuals were allowed to 
express their dissatisfaction to others by assigning costly points to them. 
These points, in contrast to the F&G treatment, did not entail any income 
loss to their receiver. By comparing the differences in the average level of 
contributions between treatments, they show that informal sanctions can 
indeed play a significant role in the provision of public goods, though this 
requires repeated interactions and their influence tends to wear off.  
Bowles et al. (2001) create a model for team production where the 
effectiveness of mutual monitoring  epends on the willingness of some 
participants to engage in costly puni ent. They then run an experiment 
identical to F&G where they were ab  to replicate their results. In addition 
they tested for the effect of the residual claim and the group size on the 
willingn d with 




ess to punish; they find the former to be positively correlate
nish and the latter to be insignificant
Carpenter (2002) argues that agents who forego material benefits to 
punish others can also be viewed as rational. Using a similar design to F&G 
and by altering the price of punishment points he shows that punishment is 








        
ments eived  shments 
given 
Average 









Subject   cont ibu on  Evolut
1  4. 0,1
2  9. 8,5,1
3  6. 10,9
4  9. ,12,
5  7. 7,9,
6  8. 5,15
7  5. 5,5
8  3. 8,8
9  3 20, 5,15
10  7. 7,6,7
0.7  0,1
12  5. 7,8,
13  4. 7,8
14  0. 3,2
15  4. 10,
16  4. 4,10
0.0  0,0
18  0. 0,0
0.0  0,0
20  3. 8,10
21  6. 10,1
0  0,0
23  3. 5,7
24  2. 5,2
Subjects 1-12 t ok p rt in sessio
  Punishments given 
on ontribution  No of 
sanctions  Tota  po
,0,8,0,5,5 6,5,5    0 
19,8 7,20 5    0 
7,8, ,6,3,     0 
,11, 7,7, ,6   14 
5,8,8 5,8,6    10 
0,8,6 5,5,6 2  10 15 
,7,6, ,4,1    4 
,0,0, ,0,0    1 
,15, 0,10 10,1     0 
0,5,6 0,15 7    5 
,1,1, ,1,   0 
0,6,7 2,2,2    7 
,2,3, ,3,2  13 13 
,0,3, ,0,0    2 
2,3,0 0,0,0    4 
0,0,0 0,0,0 0   8 
,0,0, ,0,   0 
,0,0, ,0,0    0 
,0,0, ,0,   10 
0,0, ,2,2,     0 
,5,5, ,5,5 5  17 26 
,0,0, ,0,0  0 
,0,6, ,1,1    0 
,1,0, ,0,1    11 
































4  0 , 0 7 0 0 
0  5,3,0, , , 0 9 1 1 
8  ,10,8, 5 2 0 3 1 1 
6  16 11,11 9, 6 9 0 0 0 
5  14,5, , 6 4 1 2 
4  1 ,12,1 , , 3 1 2 
1  ,6,6,5 6 4 4 0 0 
2  ,9,3,4 0 1 7 4 5 
1 .5  1 ,15,15 1 , 0 0 2 1 1 
8  ,15,1 , , 3 4 3 4 
0 
 
Table 5- STRANGERS 
11  ,1,0,1 1 0  0 13 0 
6  5,7,1 , 6 3 3 4 
0  ,7,5,7 0 1 1 1 
8  ,0,0,0 0 2 4 0 0 
1  9,9,8, , 3 0 0 0 
4  1 ,10,1 , , 6 1 0 0 
17  ,0,0,0 0 0  0 20 0  0 
0  ,0,0,0 0 0 8 0 0 
19  ,0,0,0 0 0  2 11 1  7 
1  ,10,0, 0 2 0 5 0 0 
6  0,10,6 5 , 0 0 0 
22 0. ,0,0,0 0 0  14  0  0 
9  ,9,7,2 1 0 4 1 3 
0  ,3,4,3 1 8 6 1 1 
o a n 1 and  s      
Contributions refer to the P&CP treatment.                  
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  Punishments give ishm r v punis n
iven 
Subject   Average 
contribution  Evolution of contribution  No of 
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Table 6- PARTNERS 
  
1  13.4  11,12,11,15,13,15,15,15,14,13  1  1 4 2 3
2  14.1  13,10,15,15,15,15,16,16,14,12  6  9 2 0 0
3 10.7  10,10,9,11,11,10,12,12,12,10  6  8  1 1  1 
4  13.9  14,15,15,15,15,15,15,15,15,5  3  6 4 2 3
5  3.3  3,10,0,5,0,15,0,0,0,0 2  2 0 0 0
6  4.0 5,10,8,5,2,0,0,0,0,0  1  1 1 1 1
7  2.0 20,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0  0  0 1 0 0
8  0.0 0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0  0  0 1 1 1
9 7.4 20,20,12,13,1,1,3,4,0,0  2  4 1 1 3
10  8.9  15,10,20,20,15,1,5,1,1,1  3  5 1 5 2
11 5.1  8,9,10,2,12,5,2,1,1,1  10  27 9 6  16 
12  9.5  20,20,20,10,10,10,1,3,1,0  2  3 2 1 2
13 7.0  6,8,8,8,0,8,8,8,8,8  8  25 1 0  0 
14  9.3  20,10,12,12,12,12,15,0,0,0  4  20 1 2 0
15  9.8  10,11,12,12,12,15,10,11,0,5  8  13 4 0 0
16 2.5  5,12,0,0,8,0,0,0,0,0  4  6  1 3 0  0 
17 5.6  5,7,10,7,5,0,8,8,6,0  1  2  1 2 2  5 
18 0.5  0,0,0,0,1,0,4,0,0,0  1  1  1 4 0  0 
19  9.9  8,10,11,10,10,11,9,10,10,10  0  0 9 0 0
20  11.9  15,14,13,12,11,11,11,11,11,10  25 77  0 0 0
21  14.0  20,20,20,20,10,20,20,10,0,0  0  0  1 0 0
22  7.3  10,5,10,8,7,9,13,0,10,1  3  3  2 1 4
23  14.7  20,20,20,20,20,10,20,10,7,0  1  2  1 1 2
24  17.0  20,20,20,20,20,20,20,20,10,0  0  0  1 1 1
Subjects 1-12 took part in session 3 and subjects 13-24 in the session 4. Subjects 1-4 form r   8 grou  
Contributions refer to the P&CP treatment.           
 